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This article surveys and analyzes the gen-
dered symbols and imageries in the 
hegemonic nationalist discourse in Egypt 
under Nasser and under Sisi. It asserts 
that gender binaries are projected onto 
the relation between ruler and ruled, 
state and nation, military and civilian, as a 
means to demobilize and subordinate the 
people following coups d’état. The article 
also analyzes the negative feminization of 
the Egyptian populace under Sisi, which 
serves to discredit demands for political 
participation and social justice and to 
legitimate their suppression, especially 
following the mass mobilizations of 
January 25, 2011.
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In the aftermath of the mass mobilizations 
of January 25, 2011, a notable surge in 
nationalist discourse took place in Egypt. 
The media, the ruling Supreme Council of 
the Armed Forces,1 the military-appointed 
interim government, and various public 
figures all engaged in producing a dis-
course that defined what is good for 
Egypt, who is a real patriot, and who is an 
enemy of Egypt. This discourse intensified 
around June 30, 2013, when state institu-
tions and the military, through the main-
stream media, urged people to go to the 
streets to topple the elected President 
Mohamed Morsi and to mandate the mili-
tary to carry out this purpose.2 The nation-
alist narrative that ensued—and continued 
after the military coup on July 3, 2013—was 
based on a highly gendered conception 
of patriotism and the nation. In this dis-
course, the military epitomized masculin-
ist, patriotic self-sacrifice and contrasted 
with a feminized people. A cult of the 
military leader—the then-Minister of 
Defense Abdel Fattah al-Sisi—emerged, 
and several commentators noted its like-
ness to that cultivated around the figure of 
President Gamal Abdel Nasser (1954-
1970)—who had also been among a group 
of officers staging a military coup in 1952.3
This article analyzes Egyptian hegemonic 
nationalist discourses under Nasser and 
under Sisi in their commonality and differ-
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ence, using a selection of Nasser-era films 
and songs and, for the contemporary 
period, a selection of songs, cartoons, 
newspaper columns, and public state-
ments that circulated before and following 
the military coup of July 3, 2013. The 
choice of different forms of cultural prod-
ucts to analyze the hegemonic nationalist 
discourse in the two eras is dictated by 
transformations both in the social context 
and in state propaganda strategies; under 
Nasser, low literacy rates and the state’s 
policy of using mass media to carry out 
citizen education meant that radio and TV 
played a central role in producing a popu-
lar political narrative by broadcasting 
Nasser’s speeches, as well as nationalist 
songs and operettas (Abu-Lughod 10). The 
film industry also became an important 
tool of political propaganda and ideolog-
ical production. Contemporary political 
culture, on the other hand, is produced in 
a context where the mass media are rela-
tively less centralized and largely Internet-
based, thus the use of online newspaper 
pieces, social-media-circulated cartoons 
and posters, and YouTube-broadcasted 
songs and talk shows.
I argue that highly gendered imageries 
and symbols have legitimized and rein-
forced autocratic military rule. I outline, 
however, an important difference in Sisi-
era nationalist discourse: that is the nega-
tive, misogynist, feminization of the peo-
ple, as a means to justify further political 
and economic exclusion. This study thus 
places itself in the Gramscian and 
Althusserian traditions, treating culture 
and ideology as important sites for creat-




The gendered character of nationalism 
has drawn the attention of historians and 
gender and post-colonial scholars since 
the 1980s.4 A substantial corpus of litera-
ture treating cases from various geo-
graphic and historical contexts has gone 
to show that “all nationalisms are gen-
dered” (McClintock 61). On the one hand, 
nationalism invokes existing forms of gen-
der power relations, which become its 
most powerful symbols, and, on the other 
hand, it creates and reinforces gender dif-
ference in the social realm.
Imagining and constructing the Egyptian 
nation as a woman and the use of family 
metaphors in Egyptian nationalist dis-
course are not new. Beth Baron shows that 
it began with the first manifestations of an 
Egyptian territorial sense of nationhood in 
the late nineteenth century. Nor is it unique 
to Egypt. However, as Baron remarks, “the 
prevalence of familial metaphors in 
nationalist rhetoric inside and outside 
Egypt should not obscure their different 
uses, particular resonances, and varied 
receptions” (Baron 6) and thus our need 
to explore the various ways in which 
nationalism invokes gender difference 
and to what ends.
The mobilizing functions of highly gen-
dered and sexual nationalist metaphors—
especially activated in time of war—have 
been noted in the literature. Men have 
been mobilized for fighting and self-sacri-
fice, to fulfill their masculine role as protec-
tors, and to defend their honor, embodied 
in (female) national integrity. This article, 
however, suggests that highly gendered 
Fig. 1: Sisi has been likened to Nasser as the savior 
of the Egyptian nation, through his military coup. 
Source: Al-Akhbar.
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nationalist repertoires may be employed 
for an opposite end: as a means to demo-
bilize a population and to subordinate it to 
autocratic rule, especially in cases where a 
military regime succeeds in a moment of 
revolutionary mass mobilization, through 
the projection of gender binaries onto the 
relation between state and society.
Post-colonial scholarship has analyzed 
gendered nationalism as a hegemonic 
project by the colonized intelligentsia, 
aimed at subordinating the local masses 
(Chatterjee 36). As colonial domination 
was legitimated by orientalism’s set of 
gender binaries, which contrasted a mas-
culine virile West with a degenerate and 
feminine East (Said 206-208) and a manly 
Englishman with an effeminate colonized 
man (Sinha 1-25), so has the colonized 
intelligentsia projected such paternalist 
binaries onto their relation to the local 
masses as they sought to prove that they 
were masculine enough to be the ideal 
modern national subjects and, thus, fit for 
self-government (Jacob 46).
Anti-colonial formulations of Egyptian 
nationhood were indeed marked by mas-
culinist imageries and values. Throughout 
the interwar and postwar years, the edu-
cated male youth were depicted as the 
masculine, initiative-taking patriotic 
agents, as opposed to the vain (feminine) 
partisanship of the older generation and 
the servility of the destitute uneducated 
population.5 Masculinist formulations of 
patriotism went hand in hand with the 
patriarchal imagining of the nation as a 
family, as a biological unit in which gen-
der difference functioned to advance the 
interests of the whole. This meant that 
speaking of internal forms of exploitation 
was naturally perceived as divisive and 
unpatriotic: the young nationalist intelli-
gentsia of the era expressed aversion to 
parliamentary politics and the multi-party 
system and favor for militarism as the true 
form of patriotism6 (Gershoni and 
Jankowski 4; Younis, Nidāʼ al-Shaʿb 679-
681).
The roots of Nasser-era state ideology 
have been traced back to the ethos and 
worldview of the pre-1952 effendiyya7 
(Shechter 574; Younis, Nidāʼ al-Shaʿ b 667).8 
But the particularly gendered nature of 
the nationalist narrative under the Free 
Officers and its political implications in 
terms of legitimating power hierarchies9 
remain unexplored,10 despite renewed 
interest in analyzing the ideological foun-
dations of the Nasserist regime and the 
cult of Nasser.11 To a certain extent, we may 
treat the gendered nature of Nasser-era 
nationalism, in its paternalism towards 
both women and subaltern men, as a con-
tinuation of the socio-political ethos of the 
liberal-nationalist political order (Bier 30). 
Nevertheless, I assert that the specifics of 
the gendered discourse of Nasser-era 
nationalism should be analyzed in their 
own right, as a repertoire of images and 
symbols that legitimated the eradication 
of political pluralism and reinforced auto-
cratic rule by the post-colonial regime, 
while it fostered a cult of the military 
leader, which was so powerful and left 
such long-lasting effects on collective 
memory and the national imagination that 
it could be reinvoked six decades later, 
under Sisi (Mostafa 23).
In both periods, highly gendered nation-
alist narratives—depicting the military 
leader as masculine and virile and, anti-
thetically, the nation as feminine and 
dependent, as the passive object of the 
masculine patriotic act of salvation and 
leadership—served to subordinate the 
local population, putting an end to vari-
ous forms of socio-political mobilizations 
and muting demands for political partici-
pation and social justice that preceded 
military coups d’état.
I suggest that, furthermore, post-2011 
nationalist discourse was based on addi-
tional patriarchal binaries, namely those 
juxtaposing a pure, loyal, feminine, 
abstract nation with a selfish, infertile, 
untamed, and degenerate feminine popu-
lace. On the one hand, the feminization of 
the nation is intrinsic to nationalism’s logic 
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of masculinist protection,12 and, I contend, 
becomes accentuated in the attempt to 
legitimate military dictatorships; the 
nation is depicted positively as a gener-
ous, wise, and self-sacrificing mother and 
a chaste beloved. On the other hand, the 
enemy is also feminized, albeit in a nega-
tive, misogynist sense; insubordinate 
women and men are debased, depicted 
as promiscuous sexual objects or, in the 
case of enemy men, as incompetent in the 
protection of their women’s honor.13
In the interregnum of both post-military-
coup regimes, masculinist nationalist dis-
course subsided, and instead, post-1973 
Sadat- and Mubarak-era nationalisms cen-
tered on issues of authenticity, modernity, 
and national culture. Economic liberaliza-
tion (infitāh) and its adverse effect on the 
relative status of the intelligentsia led the 
latter to highlight its exclusive cultural 
capital and to disapprove of various mod-
els of upward mobility among the poor 
and the uneducated. The latter came to be 
perceived as a threat to Egyptian nation-
hood, both to its traditions and to its pros-
pects for modernization (Abu-Lughod 60; 
Armbrust 21-34; Saad 407; Shechter 572). 
Thus, the process of divorcing Egypt from 
the Egyptians, which will be manifested in 
gendered misogynous terms around the 
military coup of July 2013, may be said to 
have originated in the cultural nationalism 
of the infitāh era.
From Humiliated Nation to Happy Bride
As a group of army officers, self-named 
the Free Officers, established a new 
regime following their coup d’état in 1952, 
they moved to eradicate political plural-
ism; they abrogated the multi-party sys-
tem, cracked down on the Muslim Brothers 
and the communists, and suppressed 
independent student and labor organiza-
tions. The practice of stripping the people 
of its agency was legitimated by the dis-
cursive projection of positive femininity 
onto the people, in contrast to the mascu-
line agency of the military leadership; only 
the latter was entitled to interpret and 
practice the agency and will of the people. 
Any attempt to exercise the new revolu-
tionary14 agency from outside the military 
leadership was portrayed as treason 
against the people, which was assumed to 
have entrusted the leader to act on its 
behalf. The people were reduced to loving 
supporters in a monogamous relationship. 
They came to be defined in opposition to 
the masculinist military leadership, i.e., 
feminized, not just in regime discourse 
and propaganda, but also in mass culture 
and public discourse.
Popular songs and films of the era reveal 
the conception of the nation as wholly 
dependent on the military and having no 
agency except through it. One of the early 
songs was ʿal-Dawār (To the Dawār15) 
(1952), sung by popular singer Mohamed 
Qandil; it celebrated the Free Officers’ 
assumption of power as good news com-
ing through the radio, indicating that the 
event became known to people, the sub-
ject of this blessed movement, in their 
total absence. The words depict this event 
as good fortune for the nation and as the 
work of the military, the agent. The military 
saves the nation, moves her from an era of 
darkness, slavery, and humiliation to an 
era of freedom, independence, and dig-
nity. The nation is the object of salvation 
and may only express her gratefulness to 
the military leadership.
Another song by the prominent singer 
and composer Mohamed ʿAbd al-Wah-
hab, Ya Maṣr Tamm al-Hanā (O Egypt, 
Everlasting Happiness is Reached) (1954) 
likens the Free Officers’ rise to power to a 
marriage concluded between the military 
leadership and Egypt, which will bring 
about everlasting happiness to the latter. 
The words depict the people as having 
waited long nights for the savior/groom, 
who finally came in the form of the Free 
Officers and whose initiative and agency 
are contrasted with the passive state of the 
object of salvation: the fortunate people.
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In the discursive performance of this mas-
culinist nationalism, the language of 
honor, shame, rape, and revenge is cen-
tral. The integrity of the nation is desig-
nated as ʿirḍ: literally, body; in common 
usage, it means the physical (sexual) integ-
rity of a woman, on whom the honor of the 
community’s males depends. ʿAbd al-
Wahhab’s song, Nashīd al-Ḥurriyya (Hymn 
to Freedom) (1952), which was the national 
anthem from 1952 to 1960, is filled with 
these sexual metaphors, as it narrates the 
shame and humiliation in which the nation 
had existed before the military patriot 
redeemed her. The song addresses the 
male whose honor lies in the complete 
possession of Egypt and the safeguarding 
of her physical/sexual integrity: “Your pre-
cious ʿirḍ was violated by the unjust, and 
shame was brought to you and to your 
ʿirḍ.” (ʿAbd al-Wahhab, “Nashīd 
al-Ḥurriyya”).
Many Nasser-era movies, such as La Waqt 
Li-l Ḥubb (No Time for Love) (1963), Fī 
Baytinā Rajul (A Man in our House) (1961), 
and Al-Bāb al-Maftūḥ (The Open Door) 
(1963) associate militarism with masculin-
ity and construct the figure of the military 
patriot as the desired male. In these films, 
the female protagonist falls in love with a 
fidāʾī (freedom fighter in the popular 
armed resistance movement of the late 
’40s early ’50s), who is contrasted with 
other men, those who are not ready to 
take up arms against the British occupa-
tion. The fidāʾī is always depicted as young 
and educated and usually organizes and 
guides patriots from among the poorer 
classes. Most importantly, militarism and 
patriotic self-sacrifice are constitutive of 
his masculinity and sex appeal. In No Time 
for Love, the fidāʾī, Hamza, is an attractive 
man with whom the female protagonist, 
Fawziyya, falls in love, although he does 
not try to obtain her love, because he is 
too busy with the patriotic cause, as stated 
in the film’s title. The fidāʾī is contrasted, 
both physically and morally, with other 
males who are not willing to fight or sacri-
fice their comfort and selfish interests. 
Hamza’s friend, Bedeir, is a homey, chubby 
man, preoccupied with household chores, 
who even likes to bake cookies. He is 
shown to be selfish, unable to appreciate 
the importance of the fidāʾī’s self-sacrifice. 
But most importantly, he is depicted as 
lacking in masculinity. His love for the 
Fig. 2: A scene from No Time For Love: Bedeir unable to obtain Fawziyya’s love. Source: Youtube. 
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female protagonist is not reciprocated. 
Bedeir embodies the non-masculine man, 
while Hamza, the fidāʾī, is the ideal mascu-
line patriot, and these contrasts are made 
to stand out throughout the film. On the 
other hand, Fawziyya discovers the mean-
ing of patriotism by falling in love with 
Hamza and in her determination to sup-
port him in his militarist plans, which, sig-
nificantly, are kept secret from her. Her 
patriotism is manifested only through her 
unconditional support for the proactive 
military patriot, who is also evidently her 
groom.
These gendered constructions pro-
duce a fetish of the military leader. He 
personifies masculinity; he is the real 
and only initiative-taker, and, most im-
portantly, he is desired by the female 
nation; hence the emergence of the 
cult of Nasser, who was depicted as 
the ultimate fidāʾī. His charisma and 
qualities were constructed through the 
ideal-type of the masculine self-sacri-
ficing patriot, to whom the feminized 
people owe their love and support. 
The assassination attempt against Nas-
ser in 1954—known as the Manshiyya 
incident—gave rise to a series of songs 
cultivating this cult of the leader as the 
savior who sacrificed his personal life 
and comfort for the sake of the nation. 
One of these was ʿAbd al-Wahhab’s 
song Tislam ya Ghālī (God Bless You 
Dear) (1954):
You have awakened your nation from a 
long sleep, 
and your fight was unprecedented
You longed to see none humiliated
Our hearts will protect you, as you are 
our beloved… 
You have endured infinite pains and 
did not complain… 
The entire valley is happy with the mi-
litary, 
after it had been humiliated…16
The relationship between the ruler and 
ruled is constructed as an organic re-
lation of protection and loyalty. In his 
song Iḥna al-Shaʿ b (We are the People) 
(1956), the popular singer ʿAbd al-
Halim Hafiz describes this relation in 
terms of conjugal love, “Congratulati-
ons, O people, happiness will be your 
lot”, and he thanks Nasser for “staying 
awake so that the sun of our happiness 
Fig. 3: A scene from No Time For Love: Fawziyya promises Hamza that their eventual marriage will help 
him fulfill, rather than hinder, his patriotic duties. Source: Youtube.
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rises”. The love and marriage metaphor 
is taken further in ʿAbd al-Wahhab’s 
1966 song Wāllā w ʿirifnā al-ḥubb (We 
have truly known love), as he sings:
 A bigger love does not exist, except,
the love of God and his prophet… 
With you, we have learned the revolu-
tion of love…
a love for the military that watches over 
us… 
This is a new meaning of love, O my 
country, 
that we have long striven to find… 
The nation’s existence becomes depen-
dent on that of the leader, as expressed in 
the verses addressing Nasser, “we have no 
existence if you had not existed” and “O 
you whose life is our life”, in ʿAbd al-Wah-
hab’s songs, demonstrating that the leader 
embodies the nation; without him, it is 
devoid of agency and even of existence. 
The 1967 defeat in the war against Is-
rael also reinforced the metaphors that 
feminized the people and depicted 
Nasser as the wanted groom, which 
served to reaffirm that this conjugal lo-
yalty was for better or for worse in the 
context of the defeat. ʿAbd al-Halim 
Hafiz sang in his famous song after the 
defeat, “our country is standing by the 
canal, washing her hair. As morning 
came as groom, he could not pay her 
dowry” (Hafiz, “ʿAdda al-Nahār”). This 
feminization again reduced the role 
of the people to that of supporting 
the leader, like a woman who loves a 
man and yearns for him to take her as 
a bride, even as he is incapacitated by 
a temporary difficulty. When Nasser an-
nounced his decision to step down fol-
lowing the military defeat, thousands 
of people went out to the streets to 
press him to reverse this decision. The 
prominent singer Umm Kulthūm sang, 
addressing Nasser in protest,
I am the people saying, stay! …
You are the remaining hope for the 
people’s tomorrow…
You are the people’s beloved, and the 
people’s blood…
The mass protests against Nasser’s resig-
nation, according to Sherif Younis, demon-
strate the extent to which the existence of 
the Egyptian nation was imagined as 
dependent on the leader, and its dignity 
and well-being as a gift from the leader 
(Al-Zaḥf al-Muqaddas). I argue, further-
more, that it is the gendered ways in which 
the relation of the feminine nation to its 
masculine leader has been imagined that 
normalized the imperative of loyalty to 
and love for the patriarch/leader, regard-
less of failures. The novelist Latifa al-Zayyat 
would write in her memoir that, at the 
sight of Nasser’s funeral, she wept and 
cried: “No one has the right to turn a 
nation into an orphan” (68). The nation felt 
like an orphan without its patriarch, and 
perhaps it also felt like a widow without 
Nasser.
Sisi-era Nationalism: A Nation Too Good 
For its People
Following the military coup against 
elected President Mohamed Morsi, the 
military leadership posed as the savior of 
Egypt against a global conspiracy and 
called on all Egyptians to unite under its 
leadership. Political opposition and criti-
cism came to be considered unpatriotic, 
irresponsible, and selfish, considering the 
magnitude of the world conspiracy against 
Egypt and the importance of the efforts 
undertaken by the military to abort the 
plan to make Egypt kneel.17 The military is 
again depicted as the only patriotic, self-
less, and apolitical entity, in contrast to 
unpatriotic and opportunistic civilian polit-
ical forces, which are likened to a woman 
who jeopardizes her integrity and needs 
constant guardianship and disciplining.
Once again, gender binaries served to 
maintain and reinforce power relations 
between military and civilian, and the 
imperative of total subordination of the 
latter to the former: the military is the only 
way the feminized civilian nation can have 
an agency and its only barrier against 
internal and external enemies. Songs and 
press columns described the toppling of 
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President Morsi as a courageous military 
achievement to save the nation from 
chaos induced by self-interested civilians. 
The nationalist operetta that has been 
most widely played following the coup, 
Tislam el-Ayādī, Tislam ya Geish Bilady 
(Bless the Hands of my Nation’s Army), 
sung collectively by several well-known 
singers, puts “the great Egyptian military” 
at the center of the definition of patriotism 
and nationhood. It thanks the military for 
having come to the aid of the nation and 
for having “brought dignity back” to the 
Egyptians (Kamel, “Tislam el-Ayādī”). In 
contrast, the mainstream media and offi-
cial discourse gradually came to depict 
the uprising of January 2011 as a moment 
of chaos and lawlessness that jeopardized 
national security and sovereignty. Its 
actors and supporters would gradually 
personify negative femininity.
The cult/fetish of the military leader of 
Nasser’s era was conjured up, more or less 
successfully. In the aforementioned song, 
General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi is referred to 
as “the hero who sacrificed himself” to 
save the nation; he “carried her (Egypt)”, 
he “knew her real value and paid a high 
price for her”, again likening the act of sav-
ing the nation and ruling it to the one-
sided decision of a man to take a spouse, 
to pay a high dowry, and to make her 
happy (Kamel, “Tislam el-Ayādī”). The 
song describes him as “a man and son of 
a man” (Kamel, “Tislam el-Ayādī”).18
Sisi’s patriotic masculine act is juxtaposed 
with Egypt’s femininity, which is described 
as “the mother of all” (sitt al-kull), “the sis-
ter”, “the womb that carried a heart stron-
ger than iron”, “the pure heart”, and “the 
weeping mother of the martyr” (Kamel, 
“Tislam el-Ayādī”). The nation becomes 
the feminine object of political agency, 
whose highest value lies in her role as the 
biological reproducer of the patriotic 
Egyptian man and in her unconditional 
loyalty to the patriarch.
Mostafa Hussein’s cartoons, published in 
the widely read governmental al-Akhbar 
newspaper, demonstrate these gendered 
perceptions. In one cartoon, Sisi is 
Fig. 4: Five years since Sisi’s statement on July 3. Source: Al-Yawm al-Sabiʿ.
Middle East – Topics & Arguments #14–2020
FOCUS 58
depicted as Superman with a military cap, 
carrying a laughing woman in a green 
rural outfit, who represents Egypt (see fig. 
5). Other cartoons depict Egypt as a 
woman in love with Sisi; in one of them, 
she is sitting and waiting for the ballot 
boxes so she can vote for Sisi; in another, 
she is recounting to a TV presenter that 
she could not bear living with her former 
husband, Morsi, and was able to divorce 
him on 30 June 2013, while seeming 
proud and happy that she was now cho-
sen by a more worthy spouse (see fig. 6).
Outside of the official press and main-
stream media, Sisi is also spoken of in the 
vocabulary of manliness and physical 
attraction, and the nation is depicted as a 
bride, as a woman in love. Various poorly 
photoshopped posters, which could be 
seen hung by shopkeepers or circulated 
on social media platforms, reproduce 
these gendered metaphors and the cult 
of Sisi as the masculine leader. On one of 
them, Sisi is portrayed riding a horse and 
holding a woman, dressed as a bride in 
white, with a Tut Ankh Amun head. The 
caption reads “A manly president” (rayyis 
dakar) and “A moon-like bride” (ʿarūsa 
amar).19
But the Sisi-era post-coup nationalist nar-
rative differs from its Nasser-era predeces-
sor in one important way; having forcefully 
replaced the first democratically elected 
president, two years after the largest mass 
mobilizations for democracy in the coun-
try’s history, the military-backed regime 
has sought legitimacy by portraying its 
opponents as the enemies of the nation, 
as the agents of an outside conspiracy 
against Egypt. Moreover, the regime’s 
adoption of economic policies that have 
exacerbated social inequalities and 
impoverished much of the population20 
has induced it to also vilify demands for 
social justice that were at the heart of the 
January 25 mobilizations. Critics of the 
regime and its economic policies would 
gradually be depicted as unpatriotic, 
greedy, and ungrateful, using misogynist 
metaphors of femininity. 
Egypt, the good mother and wife of the 
patriarch, becomes an abstract entity 
devoid of people; an ancient, glorious, 
and unique nation whose current state is 
deplorable, mainly because of the greed 
and foolishness of the Egyptians (Sisi’s fre-
quent use of the latter term replaces 
Nasser’s favorite al-shaʿ b (the people) with 
its socialist undertones); Sisi would state 
on several occasions that Egyptians are 
making too many demands on Egypt, urg-
ing them to give to Egypt instead, thereby 
Fig. 5: Mostafa Hussein’s cartoon in al-Akhbar. The 
caption reads, “Don’t be surprised. This is not an 
American movie. It’s Sisiman saving Egypt before 
she falls.”
Fig. 6: Mostafa Hussein’s cartoon in al-Akhbar. 
Egypt: “I could not stand living with him […] on 
June 30 I got a divorce […]”
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constructing a personified depiction of 
Egypt, in which Egyptians exist outside it 
and abuse it. Speaking on TV as a presi-
dential nominee in 2014, responding to a 
question about difficult economic condi-
tions, he asked the Egyptians in reproach, 
“Are you going to eat Egypt? Do you want 
to kill her?” (Al-Hadidi and ‘Issa, 00:48-
00:54). When the state engaged in 2017 in 
a campaign of confiscating land deemed 
to be the land of the state unlawfully occu-
pied by individuals, Sisi proclaimed, “this 
[land] does not belong to you. It belongs 
to Egypt. It is not ours. I am not authorized 
to give it to you” (dmc, 0:43-0:51). Egypt 
becomes divorced from its current popu-
lation, and Sisi’s love for her becomes a 
private matter, in which unsupportive 
Egyptians figure as greedy and ungrateful 
and as draining their mother Egypt’s 
resources. One of Mostafa Hussein’s car-
toons expressed this perception of the 
people as a burden on Egypt; in it, Egypt 
was depicted as an emaciated weeping 
cow and the people as hands holding 
bowls, greedily demanding more of her 
milk (see fig. 7).
Gender and sexual metaphors contrasted 
a good military with a bad people. Those 
who refused to unquestionably support 
the military and the leader were deni-
grated and portrayed either as unmascu-
line men, unable and unwilling to protect 
their women, or as a dishonorable woman: 
untamed, disgraceful, and infertile. One 
poem by the poet Mokhtar ‘Issa address-
ing Sisi included the following verses: 
“Our women are impregnated by your ris-
ing star/their men have menstruated, but 
failed to deliver/their politicians engaged 
in politics but failed to achieve.” ( “Nisaʾuna 
ḥubla bi-najmik”) The poem juxtaposes a 
manly savior against a failing, shameful, 
and lowly feminized people, who not only 
are so effeminate as to menstruate, but 
even fail at being a fertile female. The poet 
then apologetically addresses Sisi, “Don’t 
be sad, if you called out to them and found 
them to be rags with which they wipe the 
faces of their failures” (‘Issa, “Nisaʾuna 
ḥubla bi-najmik”). 
Newspaper columns and op-eds praising 
Sisi’s manly act of toppling the civilian 
president simultaneously vilified a passive, 
ungrateful, feminized people. The writer 
Mahmud al-Kerdosi’s columns in al-Watan 
newspaper asserted that the Egyptian 
people were not worthy of Sisi’s self-sacri-
fice; the Egyptian people were not just an 
unacceptable people to rule over; to 
make things worse, they also are not grate-
ful enough to the savior. Al-Kerdosi 
accused January 25 of exposing the geni-
tals (al-ʿawra) of the Egyptian citizen, which 
consist of all the shameful traits of this 
people, making the people undeserving 
of the rule of a patriotic man such as Sisi, 
that is, “the chaos (al-fawḍa), the disorder-
liness (al-infilāt), the laziness (al-tanbala), 
and the impoliteness (qellat al-adab)” 
(“Al-Sisi Mgawwaʿak?”). Al-Kerdosi states 
in one of his columns that he does not 
trust “the people” anymore and expresses 
his puzzle over “why the elite turns this 
mysterious, wild, unleashed entity into an 
absolute entity whose will should not be 
violated!” (“Koll ‘25 Yanāyir’”) He con-
cludes, “The people will always be a ride 
for the ruler, a business for the elite, and 
the enemy of itself” (“Koll ‘25 Yanāyir’”).
While Egyptians are depicted as the rea-
son behind Egypt’s malaise, the abstract 
Fig. 7: “Al-maṭālib al-fiʾawiyya” (sectoral  
demands). Source: Al-Akhbar.
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mother Egypt is glorified as a superior 
unique nation, the best that ever existed. 
The preamble to the 2014 constitution, 
drafted soon after the July 2013 coup, 
described Egypt as “the gift of Egyptians 
to humanity”, “the heart of the whole world 
[…] the meeting point of world civiliza-
tions and cultures”, “the most amazing 
wonder of civilization” (3), etc. This national 
self-glorification is coupled with a disdain 
for lay Egyptians, particularly towards 
insubordinate civilians, who now have all 
the traits of a woman degenerating into 
resisting her patriarch’s authority. A state-
ment by Sisi in a speech addressing the 
military on the anniversary of the October 
War epitomizes this negative feminization; 
commenting on the difficulties Egypt was 
now facing in reaching an agreement with 
Ethiopia on building a dam that could 
compromise Egypt’s water supply, he 
blamed the uprising of January 25, pro-
claiming that, “in 2011 […] because the 
country revealed her back and stripped 
her shoulders, anything could now be 
done to her” (eXtra news, 0:51-1:13), por-
traying the revolutionary movement for 
democracy and social justice as an invita-
tion by a promiscuous woman to be pen-
etrated by outsiders. Similarly, one car-
toon by Mostafa Hussein depicted the 
street rallies (al-waqafāt al-iḥtijājiyya) as a woman protesting to her sleeping hus-
band, while her appearance insinuates 
that she is demanding sexual intercourse 
(see fig. 9). On the other hand, those men 
making what came to be termed sectoral 
demands on Egypt, i.e., demands for eco-
nomic rights, are depicted as stripping 
Egypt of her clothes, exposing her and 
making her vulnerable to rape, rather than 
fulfilling their masculine role of defending 
and protecting her ʿ irḍ, as depicted in one 
of Mostafa Hussein’s cartoons (see fig. 10).
Fig. 8: Cartoon by Mostafa Hussein commenting 
on clashes between protesters and the police in 
2012. Egypt to protester: “You are not a revolu-
tionary. What takes you there, you coward! You 
deserve to be shot.” Source: Akhbar al-Yawm.
Fig. 10: “The Scandal”: sectoral demands strip-
ping “Egypt’s economy” of her clothes. Source: 
Al-Akhbar.
Fig. 9:  Man: “Oh no! Too many ‘rallies’ these 
days.” Source: Al-Akhbar
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It remains to explore how the gendered 
and patriarchal framework through which 
Egyptian nationhood has been repeatedly 
imagined, and especially as it has been 
particularly narrated under Sisi, has nur-
tured household patriarchy and everyday 
masculinism. It is no surprise that with the 
increasing defeat and silencing of the rev-
olutionary tide of January 2011 in favor of 
a hegemonic patriarchal nationalism, sex-
ual harassment peaked and became par-
ticularly violent against activist women on 
Tahrir Square.21 Significantly, the military 
also conducted virginity tests on female 
activists detained at a protest in March 
2011.22 The targets of this masculine vio-
lence were the very women who claimed 
political agency and presence in public 
space, challenging both the premises of 
patriarchal nationalism and the everyday 
exercise of patriarchy.23
Conclusion
Nationalist narratives under Nasser and 
under Sisi have been highly gendered; 
the nation is modeled after the family, and 
the masculine qualities of the military 
leader are contrasted with the femininity 
of a dependent nation, imagined as the 
passive object of the masculine patriotic 
act of salvation and protection. Patriarchal 
binaries are projected onto the relation 
between state and nation, military and 
civilian, thereby demobilizing and subor-
dinating the people to autocratic military 
rule.
Despite similarities between the two 
nationalist narratives, I have highlighted 
an important transformation in the depic-
tion of the people, which comes to be 
negatively feminized under Sisi: it is 
depicted as opportunistic, ungrateful, and 
irresponsible, in contrast with the positive 
representation of a courageous, self-sacri-
ficing, and achieving military leader. I have 
argued that this negative feminization 
stems from the regime’s need to discredit 
its opponents. A new dualism is thus con-
structed between the abstract nation as a 
mother, as a pure female figure that natu-
rally obeys and loves the patriarch, and 
the protesting people as an untamed, 
infertile, dishonorable, and oversexed 
woman, as an enemy of itself. 
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al-Rihīm’s song “Sisi ragil 
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